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TERRORISM AND THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Since the return of democracy in Nigeria in 1999, the security system of the country was challenged by the rise of insurgency in different parts of the country, so much so that, there was the emergence of various militant groups in the Niger Delta region and Boko Haram in the North East. Very recent also, there is the emergence of armed banditry with its attendant crimes (kidnapping, Fulani herdsmen attack) in the North West, South East and North Central regions. It is no doubt that, with all these internal security ambiances has been quite tense and volatile over the years. It was based on this background that, this study was carried out in order to examines the challenges of internal security facing Nigeria as it relate to the activities of the Boko Haram sect, armed banditry and Fulani herdsmen. Data for this study were generated from secondary sources such as textbooks, periodical and other materials relevant to the study. The findings revealed that terrorism is an ugly phenomenon, is a global threat to the development of human civilization, because of its destruction, and the serial acts of terrorism are determined by the dominant consciousness of the ruling elites. The paper further contend that since the nation is immune from the menacing consequences of terrorists, the neglected and mismanagement of internal security, which is the based-line of a nation's defense by Nigeria government, makes the country vulnerable to attacks by the Boko Haram sect, armed banditry and Fulani herdsmen attacks. The paper therefore, concludes that rather than strengthening the coercive apparatuses of power and security, what is required are social justice and effective management of national resources and the need to curb corruption, thuggery, political, social and economic tensions in the country. When this is done, it will not only strengthen internal security management and depend, patriotism.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Boko Haram, Banditry, Herdsmen, Management and Internal Security.*

INTRODUCTION

It is a fact that by the very nature of man, he will definitely fight the encumbrances which emanate from unjust social systems. No doubt, that man has begun reacting in various ways that could best be described as shocking is "terrorism", which seeks to unleash violent attacks mostly on the state institutions and establishments. The reality of terrorism in both the international scene and within country can no longer be wished away or down-

played (Williams, 2006). Obviously, it has become part and parcel of our contemporary international arena.

Terrorism as an ugly phenomenon is a global threat to the development of human civilization, because of its destruction. The concerns and preoccupation with terrorism at the global system, is but an understatement, considering the necessity for peace, security, stability, justice and development. In a situation where the individual persons, and state within the international arena are filled and consumed by fear of existence, because of the morbid ambition for national survival or a vengeful, blind, but evil act to dehumanize the essence of humanity, calls for serious intellectual and state's concerns (Lacquer, 1977).

As Nigeria faces the destructive consequences of terrorists (Boko Haram) mechanizations, she have to brace up to the challenges of managing effectively internal security with the collaboration within the larger international community. It is in this direction, that the Boko Haram phenomenon and the management of Nigeria's internal security became imperative for intellectual analysis and recommendations. This paper is divided into four parts. Part I examines conceptual clarifications of terrorism, and internal security. Part II takes a look at the dimensions of Boko Haram movement. While part III interrogates the Boko Haram sect insurrections, while part IV deals with armed banditry and Fulani herdsmen crises in Nigeria. Part V deals with conclusion and recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

Terrorism

It is very important to state that, as individuals one may prefer stability to change, equilibrium and not chaos, but as Heraclitus (544 – 484BC), the Greek philosopher, succinctly states, 'you cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on'. This means that 'all is flux, nothing stays still' or remains static. Everything is constantly in a state of flux and carries within it perpetuity and change, stability and instability, order and disorder. An important change between our times and the earlier ones is that we live in a world of quick and unprecedented global change (Ramaswamy, 2006).

The concept of terrorism has been overtime subjected to various meaning, depending on who is defining it and the interest it tends to serve. But it is agreed amongst scholars and analysts that terrorism has long been part of man's existence. Historically, the beginning of terrorism or its emergence could be traced from the pristine era of first communism, which was anchored from the Angelica era. Since then, terrorism has become a daily companion of man, and overtly and covertly determines the social relations between the strong and the weaker social class, and nations (Sadeeque, 2007).

By the very nature of man, it is believed that he will definitely fight the encumbrances which emanate from unjust social systems (Okpeh, 2002), and to this man has begun reacting in different ways to the unjust world system. One of such ways that could best be described as shocking is "terrorism". Terrorism, according to Fidel Castro... "is a two sides of the same coin"... it is man inhumanity to man express through bloody violence either as an aggressor feeling to colonize, control and exploit and individual, a society, community or a state. or as a victim which is presently the vale rather than the exception, seeking to free, liberate and emancipate himself, his society, community or his country against the hydra-headed monster of globalization.

Consequently, we argue that terrorism involves illegal acts of violence by groups with political aims or ideological inclinations intended to strike fear or induce sympathy which may not necessarily result in the seizure of political power. Terrorists are clandestine groups who pursue their cause through the use of terror. Such ends may be to cause anarchy elicit sympathy for self-determination or to intimidate a political adversary (Cyril, 2005). Terrorism often involves the wanton destruction of lives and property or the inflicting of immense suffering on victims who in most cases are not directly responsible for the political problems the terrorist claim to be fighting such as what the Nigeria state is facing with the activities of the Boko Haram in the Northern states.

Terrorism may be a response to injustice, if there were political and social (economic) justice, there would be no terrorism (Lacquer, 1977). But however we look at it, terrorism remains an illegitimate means of conflict resolution and constitutes criminal rather treated as outlaws both by domestic and international law. Yet, in other cases, terrorism has been successful in forcing big and otherwise powerful adversaries to seek negotiated ends to conflict. However, on the balance, the use of terror is becoming an unviable endeavour in our contemporary world, especially when such terror is driven by hate, revenge and the desire to instill fear in the minds of defined enemies.

Internal Security

The central thesis of this paper is the concept of internal security. It is a well-known fact that internal security is the very foundation upon which nation state's defense is built. Internal security essentially means the freedom from or the absence of those tendencies which could undermine internal cohesion and the corporate existence of the state. More so, it also implies the ability and capacity to ensure the protection and survival of vital institutions basically for the promotion of a country's core values, including the socio-political and economic goals. As rightly stated by (Imobighe, 1990), internal security means freedom from danger to life and property towards creating a conducive atmosphere for the citizens to pursue their legitimate interest within the society they live in. Calthers (2010) further sees internal security as a totality of the nation's equilibrium state which needs to be maintained so that the nation can carry out its normal function without unnecessary interruption from anywhere.

Our observation from the above, we state that internal security can be said to be the freedom from any potential act or intention to undermine the peace, stability, harmony and progress of the citizens and the country at large. When the internal security of a country is under threat, as it is with Nigeria through the Boko Haram insurgency which is the single: biggest security nightmare to confront the country since after amalgamation in 1914, it means that prospects of the communities working in a harmonious relationship is seriously undermined and eventually created a security threat that undermine the security of the nation.

Banditry

Banditry means occurrence or prevalence of armed robbery or violent crime. It involves the use of force, or threat to that effect, to intimidate a person with the intent to rob rape or kill. Banditry is a crime against persons. It has been a common genre of crime, as well as because violence in contemporary societies (Nigeria Watch, 2011). The concept of banditry has been changing over time, space and circumstances. A bandit in the 19th century Europe and Americas was a freedom fighter whose aim was partly to ensure the

emancipation of the downtrodden from the upper class or colonized over the colonizer (Paleri, 2008). Furthermore, bandits like Chucho el Roto, HerachioBernel and Santanon were often celebrated as heroes of Mexican independence. Therefore, Mexicans have warm regards and respect for those “social workers” termed bandits, while on the contrary, the State often considered them as nuisance and outlaws that need to be eradicated (Michael & Watts, 1987). According to Rotberg (2007), “crime against persons, including murder, rape, and robbery has grown in scale and viciousness in Nigeria since 1999”. This has been demonstrated by the pervasive trend of armed robbery in the country, which in effect mirrors the Africa-wide experience. In this regard, Onimode opines that:

Car snatching robbery of homes and offices, way-laying of travellers (high-way robbery) are common forms of armed robbery in African countries. Their incidence has been rising since the African crises started in the 1980s (Onimode, 2001:37).

Therefore, in some pre-industrial societies peasants see bandits differently from the State not as outlaws, hoodlums and miscreants but as avengers and “bread winners”. However, a bandit in traditional African setting is entirely opposite to that of Americas and Europe, the former specialized in armed robbery and other related crimes (Curott & Fink, 2010). The most common feature of banditry in Africa has been maiming, killing and wanton destruction of properties and hence, it has a direct relationship with cattle rustling (Rufa’l, 2017). Since most herdsmen could do anything possible to prevent the rustling of their herds, then the bandit also apply force with the aid of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) to ensure effective stealing of livestock (Addo, 2006). Hence, the application of force during livestock theft is what is herein considered banditry and dynamic operating pattern of crime.

Herdsmen

Fulani herdsmen or Fulani pastoralists are nomadic or semi-nomadic Fulani people whose primary occupation is raising livestock. The Fulani herdsmen are largely located in the Sahel and semi-arid parts of West Africa, but due to relatively recent changes in climate patterns, many herdsmen have moved further south into the savannah and tropical forest belt of West Africa. The herdsmen are found in countries such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Guinea, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon. In Senegal, they inhabit northeastern Ferlo and the southeastern part of the country (Aliyu, 2015).

The people are found in large number in Nigeria but while some have moved into the cities, many are still living as seminomadic herders. However, these group who own and rear herds of animals like cattle for commercial purposes are called Herdsmen. Fulani herdsmen or Fulani pastoralists are nomadic or semi nomadic herders whose primary occupation is raising livestock (Idowu, 2017). They usually move their herds from one place to another in search of pasture and fresh water. It is predominantly the occupation of the Fulani ethnic group in Nigeria. They are often armed and visibly move about with weapons (like daggers, matchets, arrows etc.) to protect their livestock. The more disturbing issue about the Herdsmen is that they also block the highways with their cattle, rob and kidnap people, keep them captives in the bush and demand for ransom. The Herdsmen have also been involved in the rape of old and young women and burning of communities. Due to

their violent nature and associated killings, the group was recently described as the world's fourth deadliest militant group (Mikailu, 2016).

Dimensions of the Boko Haram Movement

It is unfortunate that Nigerians are forced to continue to battle with the impacts of structural social and economic crises occasioned by most often weak moral fibre of political institutions in the last, few decades which has consumed immeasurably life, property and time.

Needless to say, the generation of Nigerian elite from 1970s through to 1980s to the present, have failed the nation in virtually sphere, is an understatement. We have, in Nigeria today elite, that takes pride in seeing fellow citizens live in abject poverty and squalor elite that is happy to be the only educated and enlightened ones; elite that pride itself of being the richest in the country, while majority can't afford to feed their families. Nigerian elites have failed the nation, with all sense of responsibility the Nigerian people deserve better. But look at the country today; check the indices of education, check the state of our public schools, hospitals, look at our industries, check out how we are faring in agriculture, etc. But we ask what are our elites doing? To secure a position in either the civil service, public offices or ensure winning elections by 'do or die' and afterwards abuse the public office by stealing public funds meant for education, for health care, for water, electricity etc.

Book itself, the Hausa name for western education, was derived from the word 'Boka', or sorcerer. To draw a sharp contrast, the Local Islamiyya School was called Makarantar Allah, or God's school. As the year rolled by, though, and the educated elite took change of things and (initially) did a good job of it, Boko became a respected word in the Muslim North. The book schools taught Islam more effectively, than the allo schools did, and many 'Yan boko' have a deeper knowledge of Islam than most peasants have. In fact Mhamud Jega (2009) argued that, "the local Islamiyya Schools' production of almajirai was also a minus for them, and the armies of the Boko Haram sect must have been recruited from the almajirai. Besides, the Muslim community's initial fear, that boko could lead to wholesale Christianization, did not happen".

Book Haram which is generally believed is an anti-thesis of the boko ideology. The followers of this world view may not be "educated" the boko way; but they see the havoc facing their society, failures of leadership and governance, poverty in the midst of plenty and the uncountable contradiction in the Nigerian society. The group was led by Late Mallam Mohammed Yusuf who was able to mobilize his members to organize attacks against government institutions. The continue violence unleashed by the group has led to loss of lives when the militants attacked police stations, prisons and civilians in various states such as Bauchi, Borno, Yobe and few places in Kano. Those who have kept a record of the activities of the militant youth recalled that it is the same in Yobe earlier called the Taliban that had organized similar violence in 2001 and 2003 and also in 2006. They were driven out of Kananma in Yusufari, a remote part of Yobe near the Niger Republic border during Governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim's administration. They re-grouped and waxed stronger in Borno state and the result was what unfolded in other states in the north and the FCT.

The current insurgencies can be traced to the event of 2009 when the police operatives reportedly killed Muhammad Yusuf, the founder and leader of the Boko Haram sect after his apparent capture in Maiduguri, Borno state. The remnants of what was left of

the insurgents launched series of targets attacks on government institutions and banks even as police and military institutions were not left out.

The Nigerian government on its side has used series of military measures to seek to contain the growing violence; with little success. The high profile attacks on the United Nations building, the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters and the Christmas day bombing of a Catholic Church in Madalla, all in Abuja. Moreso, the January coordinated bombing by the Boko Haram sect in Kano battered Nigeria's image in the international community as a haven for terrorists, in the class of Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Algeria.

With the sect's methods becoming increasingly sophisticated and audacious. One of the contested domains is whether the sect has links with foreign terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The government thinks it does. In June 2009 the Nigerian State Security Service claimed that members of the Boko Haram were being trained in Afghanistan and Algeria by members of al-Qaeda. The Nigeria president Goodluck Jonathan re-echoed that much a day after the August 26, 2011 bombing of the UN building in Abuja when he stated that "Boko Haram is a local group linked up with terrorist activities". But not everyone buys this. As argued by Jideofor Adibe (2012), that the government has a vested interest in presenting Boko Haram as having a linkage. He asserted One, it will makes it easier to attract international sympathy and technical assistance from European countries and USA which are normally paranoid about any group rumoured to be linked to Al Qaeda. Two, linking Boko Haram to Al-Qaeda will blunt criticisms against the government's inability to contain the group after it, if the USA and European countries, with all their resources and capabilities have not been able to effectively contain Al-Qaeda, why will anyone see it as a sign of weakness that the government has not been able to defeat an organization it sponsors? Three, by linking Boko Haram to Al Qaeda the government may hope to use innuendos and name dropping of US involvement to frighten the sect and help to pressure it to the negotiating table.

What is more disturbing is that, having realized the futility of fighting the government directly, the sect members now undertake a suicidal mission. But unfortunately, government have being treating all the apparent security threats with levity; only to wake up after the damage has been done and adopted hap-hazards and after – thought measures that is in itself self-indicting. If all the paraphernalia of government were working to secure internal security, including intelligence agencies, the issue wouldn't have degenerated to such a sorry pass. The manner of approach adopted by the security agents in containing the menace leaves much to be desired. It had effectively demonstrated the fact that our leaders have not been good students of power management theories.

A very disturbing aspect of the crisis is not just in its manifestation but even the strategy deployed by the members of the Boko Haram sect in tackling unsuspecting public and the law enforcement agencies especially the police. The strategic onslaught deployed by the sect movement indicated that more superior military strategies than ones deployed by similar rebellions (Maitatsine rebellion in 1981) in the past characterized the manner of attack and thus responsible for inflicting heavy causality amongst the law enforcement agencies and the citizens as the insurgency continue. As argued by Kabiru Mato (2009), "as such insurrections continue to occur, strategies are changing because the sect are learning by the day from the mistakes of the past while the nation's security apparatuses continue to deploy either same or even weaker methodologies of dealing with the security issue".

Having clarified the posture of the Boko Haram sect against governments and its citizens, we proceed to examine the management of homeland or internal security in the face of the growing trend of Boko Haram insurrections.

Perspectives on Armed Banditry in Nigeria

Banditry has to do with armed violence perpetrated by criminal opportunists and syndicates in the countryside and frontiers of countries (Okoli & Okpalekea, 2014). It comprises acts of armed criminality targeting at human life or property: armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling and allied armed violence (Okoli & Okpaleke 2014b). Extant literature on the nature and incidence of rural banditry mostly perpetrated by nomads has yielded a number of thematic perspectives. Foremost among these perspectives is the narrative that situates the phenomenon as a necessary complication of farmer-herder crisis in a volatile security context characterized by the declining state's capacity to govern (Olaniyan & Yahaya, 2016). The second perspective characterizes the occurrence as a disguised terrorism that bears the trappings of neo-jihadism (Omilusi, 2016).

This perspective resonates with the popular local cynical anecdotes to the effect that such violence represents the calculated effort to further the islamization of the wider northern Nigeria with the Middle Belt region as the focal target. The third perspective is a narrative, which accounts for the problem from the standpoint of ethno-communal violence complicated by the fault lines of identity conflict (Okoli & Atelhe, 2014).

Beyond the conflicting and contending perspectives above, it is pertinent to note that banditry is not a novelty in Nigeria. Anecdotal and scholarly accounts have it that the phenomenon predated Nigeria's emergence as a political entity. Contemporary narrative on rural banditry in Nigeria presents a pathetic humanitarian scenario. In effect, the bandits "have been robbing people on highway, rustling cattle, looting, laying siege on rural markets and killing innocent people" (CDD, 2015). Significantly, this pattern of criminality has become a leading cause of violence in Nigeria over the recent years (Azad, Crawford & Kaila, 2018). Most existing works on aspects of banditry in Nigeria have tended to be situating their account on the farmer-herder problematic (Gambari, 2018; Ahmad, 2019). Although the phenomenon bears substantively on the dialectics of farmer-herder crisis, such a perspective must be contextually problematized in any meaningful attempt to understand properly how the criminality obtains and prevails.

The occurrence of banditry is not peculiar to Nigeria. In effect, the phenomenon has been an important facet of the national security debacle in the conflict-ridden countries of Africa's Sahel and Sahara (Gaye, 2018). Even beyond the shores of Africa, organized rural banditry has prevailed in places like Latin America where it is often implicated in the morass of drug war. Also in the Far East, rural banditry has been a veritable form of the so-called 'frontier criminality' (Callen, Gulzar, Rezaee & Shapiro, 2018). It has also been prevalent in the agrarian sector of Sweden within the continental belt of Europe (FAO, 2009). The common identifier of banditry across these climes is its apparent opportunistic and predatory tendencies, which has made its occurrence intractable in some cases.

Violence between herdsmen and sedentary population across Nigeria

Previous studies in various states report that there have been massive Fulani herdsmen invasions on the local farmlands which have triggered violent land use conflicts (Aliyu, 2015). It has been stated that for a decade, over 9,000 lives have been lost with more than 300,000 internally displaced people through the attacks of Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria

(Kingdom News, 2020). Many rural communities have been dispersed and their inhabitants thrown into confusion, thereby, breaking the cohesion of the communities and threatening the survival of the local population. It has also been stated that Fulani herdsmen, after attacks, occupy the lands from which they violently and murderously evict the local farmers, and that security forces and the government thereafter, take steps to secure the Fulani possession of the occupied lands (Ojomoyela, 2016; Kingdom News, 2020).

There is by all accounts a pattern in the poor administration of such emergencies. In the prompt previous administration of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, for instance, the Jos emergencies continued regardless of the nearby and worldwide clamor (Okeke, 2014). From 1996 to 2006, around 121 individuals have lost their lives in Bauchi and Gombe States alone because of such clashes. On thirteenth July, 2014, 10 people were murdered in conflicts between neighborhood ranchers and Fulani herders in the Pilagani Street of Langtang, North Local Government of Plateau State (Ovuakporie & Agbakwuru, 2016). On the fourteenth of July, 2014, more than 50 individuals were accounted for dead in Pilagani region of Marakun Local Government Area, Zamfara State in a related clash (Premium Times 2016). In May, 2015, likewise, finished a hundred people have kicked the bucket in towns and outcast camps situated in Ikura, Benue State, from assaults by presumed herders. Since the start of this current year, more than one hundred neighborhood ranchers and blameless occupants have been slaughtered by Fulani herders (Opejobi, 2016).

In 2015, the fierce Fulani herders were positioned the fourth deadliest brigand aggregate on the planet by the Global Conflict Index. In spite of this and the various individuals murdered, the government has neglected to take intense activities (Stein, 2016). In Benue state for instance, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria expressed that the assaults on their nearby ranchers is a type of striking back for the taking of one hundred bovines by individuals from the rustic groups that have been under assault. Moreover, in 2016, more than 1,042 inhabitants have been murdered in Benue State because of the ceaseless bleeding conflicts. In 2015, around seven towns were invade by Fulani herders in Agatu Local Government, seven famers executed in Ikpele and Okpopolo regions of the state and uprooting more than 6000 inhabitants" (Stein, 2016).

About 15 Local government areas out of 23 in Benue including Agatu had been invaded by the herdsmen, killing thousands of residents, destructing homes and farmlands, and raping the wives and daughters of men in these communities (Opejobi, 2016). Another notable hotspot of Fulani herdsmen invasion is Ukpabi-Nimbo Community in Enugu State, about 300 herdsmen invaded this community with guns and machetes, shooting sporadically, killing people, setting houses and vehicles ablaze (Mikailu, 2016).

Other notable hotspots of Fulani herdsmen invasion include Plateau (Berom Community), Lagos (Agege), Ekiti (Oke Ako Community), Taraba (Gashaka), Ibadan (Lagelu), Delta (Ossissa community), Kwara (Lagun, Iyana Offa, Offa communities), Akure, Nasarawa, Abia and Imo state to mention but a few. The Mercy Corps (2015) puts Fulani herdsmen as the most deadly militant group in Nigeria with a record killing of 1,229 people in 2014, which is a steady rise from 63 in 2013. The Fulani militants accounted for 97% of all deaths in 2014 as against 67% recorded by Boko-Haram (Mercy Corps, 2015). Out of 163 countries analyzed in the "2015 Mercy Corps", Nigeria ranks 149th on the list Global Conflict Index. This further showcases the dilapidating state of peace in Nigeria (Mercy Corps, 2015).

Between 19 and 20th July, 2020, at least 27 people were killed within a 24-hour period by armed assailants of Fulani ethnicity on communities in southern Kaduna state (CNN News, July 25th, 2020).

BOKO HARAM INSURRECTIONS, BANDITRY AND FULANI HERDSMEN: ASSESSING THE MANAGEMENT OF NIGERIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY

It is a well-known fact that the Boko Haram Terrorists were products of the frustrations of the Nigerian corruption and grinding poverty. The pervasive poverty and misery in the country as a whole, religious bigotry engendered by the ruling class has blossomed into full blown fundamentalism with various smaller sections of the ruling class using it to foster their pecuniary interests while younger disillusioned minds, who have been deprived of basic living means have found solace in religious fundamentalism.

Karl Marx rightly asserted that religion is the opium of the masses. The meaning of that is not in the superficial mantra which many of our ulamas and clergies have tended to interpret it but mainly in situations such as this is which people take solace in those temporary opium that tend to give them hope away from the dominant reality that is often unfriendly as in the case of Boko Haram sect which has enjoyed a tremendous fanatical following, that now has suicide bombers with explosives. This put to question the extent to which the nations internal security is been managed.

Although homeland or internal security is the baseline of nation's defense, it has been seriously neglected by the agents of the Nigerian state, in favour of external security. That is why there is much bias in terms of support for the armed forces in Nigeria. Whether neglect of internal security prepared fertile ground for the recruitment of terrorism and give enthusiasm to it strength; we argued that conscious of the fact that no amount of internal security can avert terrorism, for it is instructive to note that it is the social tension and friction within the country that has the capacity to encourage or discourage international or local terrorism, because of its capacity to network across the world in search of resource mobilization and leadership.

It is a fact that crimes Nigeria is used to are armed robbery and car snatching. But Boko Haram has brought a new trend of violence in some states in the north. It is in this respect that the management of internal security of Nigeria is very imperative. In Nigeria, it is observed that there has been much bias in favour of national defense to safeguard national security, hence over the years it get the lion share of the national security budget.

The above assertion is very true; although there is lack of vital information, the fact is that Nigeria as it is today cannot boast of a well-researched and articulated internal security policy. Without a policy, there cannot be the basis for effective management of internal security challenges as posed by the wide spread of Boko Haram suicide bombers with explosives in the northern part of Nigeria at present.

As rightly observed by Williams (2006), the doctrine for internal security has been a very conservative one as the tendency of managers of national security worldwide tends to strengthen the coercive apparatuses of power. The nature of our conservative and coercive power politics in the internal security management of Nigeria's defense, has aided to expose it to threats of ethno-religious crises and terrorism, as various elements in the society who felt marginalized, cheated and dissatisfied with the managers of the state, may attracts sympathies from, and are courted by other terrorist groups off shore, who may have a

genuine claim of fighting for social justice. Being a network, terrorist groups are well funded either by states or non-state actor in the case of Al Qaeda depending on the interest and the threats involved.

What we are witnessing now may not be the last in the country, going by the nature of ruling class in the country, who has neglected the positive, but non-coercive apparatus which have the tendency to redress social injustice and avert threats to the internal cohesion and corporate existence of the nation, where individual citizens pursue their legislate socio-political and economic activities, without fear or harassment from individuals or groups.

Despite our understanding of terrorism, whether as an ideology, better still, a blind hatred for human development, Nigeria as an actor in the international arena is; and cannot be expected to be immune from it. It becomes more dangerous, and a breeding ground for terrorist, when the Nigerian state itself is an agent of terror in the hands of the dominant political class who are perpetuating endemic social crisis which has put corruption, ineptitude and lack of concern as the hallmarks of governance. That is why, the management of internal security through a progressive doctrine is imperative in the fight against Boko Haram insurrections.

In Nigeria, it was observed that the level of insecurity has increased since the return to democratic governance in May, 1999. These insecurities are caused by communal clashes, ethnic/tribal conflicts, religious riots/conflicts, militancy and ritual killings, cultism and ethnic militia attacks and the farmers-herdsmen conflicts (Haruna, 2013). These further increased with the arrival of the *Boko Haram* insurgency in the North-East from 2009 to date. The level of insecurity further increased with the changing of the farmer-herdsmen clashes into banditry and cattle rustling particularly between 2010 to date in some states of the North. This form of insecurity further changed to not only banditry, cattle rustling but to also include kidnapping of people for ransom.

Concerning capitalist society like Nigeria, the material arrangement of the system is characterized by structural imbalance with manifestations of some features of inequality, unemployment, poverty, injustice, and inhumanity thereby could be responsible for the occurrences of social problems, such as armed robbery in the country. For example, the political arrangement in a society like Nigeria is such that there is an unequal access to power among the citizens to the extent that only the tiny group of elites can have it (Umar, 2010).

This violence has taken terror dimensions, such that violent agitations have claimed thousands of lives, other thousands displaced and inestimable properties have been destroyed rendering the region one of the most dangerous zones to live in Nigeria today. Each of these dimensions, singly and conjointly, greatly affects the nation's stability and well-being (Sheima & Usman, 2008). Threats to human and national security ranges from the menace of separatist demands, illegal militia armies, ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, armed robbery, corruption and poverty to sabotage public properties, economic sabotage and environmental degradation. This predominant threats and security challenges in the area are emanating from un-abating attacks on arm proliferation, youth restiveness, kidnap and hostage taking among others becomes order of the day. This has resulted to the multifaceted conflicts across different geo-political zones in the country as there is insurgency in the North-East, pipeline vandalism and activities of militants in the Niger Delta

in the South-South and endemic cattle rustling and rural armed banditry in the North-West and North-Central zones respectively. Thus, Nigeria needs the involvement of informal security actors in peace and conflict resolution more than ever before.

CONCLUSION

From what has been said so far, the paper concludes that failure on the part of government security agents to protect its citizens from incessant attacks by armed bandits, herdsmen attacks and other social vices could be seen as a failure on the part of government to fulfill its part of the social contract. This could lead to social unrests especially when such citizens are fed up and their efforts are no more effective in curtailing and preventing acts of boko haram, armed banditry and herdsmen attack.

Like others similar before it, Boko Haram sprang up as a response to the failures of the modern state movement to address basic social vices that are eating deep into the conquer warm of the society. If what we hear as reasons from members of the group to hate western education and civilization is anything to go by, the failure to curb corruption, thuggery, political, social and economic tensions in the society were used by leaders of the group to attract the attention of those who are mostly victims of misrule to such an extent that they felt sense of belonging and relief and own up to such groups. Then the experience in Nigeria in terms of management of resources has been a disaster.

As rightly stated by Iweze (1991), that corruption, inefficiency and the discriminatory utilization and exploitation of Nigeria's resources coupled with the control of the commanding height of the Nigerian economy by foreigners in conspiracy with the local elites are threats to the internal security of a nation. The reality of life in Nigeria is such that the social condition of the generality of the people is synonymous with misery and wretchedness in the midst of stupendous inducement. What is left are disillusionment, social alienation, social injustice and no sense of commitment to the nation, most especially the youth, who constitute the bulk of the productive energy of the nation. The social and national consciousness needed by the state from the citizenry is lacking. Hence, subterranean and clandestine groups who subscribe to the values and ethos of terrorism. All these undermine internal security which is the baseline of Nigeria's defense.

The contention of this paper is that the Nigerian state through the dominant class encouraged the subversive and terrorist conditions in the country. The subversion and terrorist attack by Boko Haram in northern part of the country are so effective because the Nigerian state failed to effectively mobilize its citizens for national goals. Hence, the erosion of national consciousness and patriotism which renders internal security threatened thereby weakening national defense, in the wake of the destructive intent and acts of terrorism.

Nigeria at present is confronted with serious internal security issues, not only the Boko Haram but also ethno-religious crises in Jos, Nasarawa state and Taraba and the militancy in the Niger Delta. As stated earlier the emphasis of the Nigeria state on the coercive apparatus to deal with the threat to internal security, can only be met with counter coercive instrument of terror, all the government need to do is to address the issues of religious, political extremism, and criminal mismanagement of the nation commonwealth.

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